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This  paper  models  the  central  theme  of  mercantilism  in  Jacob  Viner's 
interpretation-power  vs  plenty-in  a  framework  of  modern  theory  of 
international  finance.  It  is  shown  that,  in  the  Viner  model  of  mercantil­
ism,  a  nation  with  strong  mercantilist  sentiment  ends  up  with  large 
foreign  asset  accumulation  and  high  consumption  in  the  long  run;  an 
import tariff leads to more foreign asset holding and more total consump­
tion;  furthermore,  in  the  Viner  model,  the  Harberger-Laursen-Metzler 
effect  exists  unambiguously:  a  permanent  terms-of-trade  deterioration 
causes  a  current  account  deficit  in  the  short  run.  (JEL  F1,  F3,  BO). 
©  1997  Elsevier Science  Ltd. 
This  paper  offers  a  mathematical  model  of  mercantilism  according  to  the 
interpretation  by  Jacob  Viner  (1937,  1948,  1968,  1991)  while  including  the 
interpretations of mercantilism by Schmoller (1897), Cunningham (1907, 1968), 
and Heckscher (1935, 1955) as special cases of the Viner model. Even though 
mercantilism  has  been  examined,  criticized,  or  even  ridiculed  since  Adam 
Smith,  only  recently  has  a  formal  model  of  mercantilism  been  presented  by 
Irwin  (1991)  in  a  framework  of  the  strategic  trade  theory.  To  address  the 
central  theme of  mercantilism,  I develop the Viner model of  mercantilism  in 
an  extended  framework  of  international  finance  and  organize  the  study  as 
follows. 
In section I, I define the utility function of a representative  nation on both 
consumption  and foreign  asset  accumulation  to  capture  'power  vs  plenty  as 
objectives' of mercantilism (Viner, 1948, 1991).  In this way, a nation derives its 
power in the international community directly from its possession of wealth. 
In section  II,  I  first  look at how the  mercantilist  mentality affects  long-run 
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consumption  and  foreign  asset  accumulation  and  show  that  a  nation  with 
strong mercantilist sentiment will have high long-run consumption and foreign 
asset  holdings.  Furthermore,  an  import  tariff  advocated by  mercantilists  as  a 
result of their 'fear of goods' (Heckscher, 1955) will lead to more foreign asset 
accumulation  and  more  total  consumption  (the  sum  of  domestic  goods  and 
foreign  goods).  Finally,  using  the  Viner  model  of  mercantilism,  I  show  the 
unambiguous existence of the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler (H-L-M) effect: a 
permanent terms-of-trade deterioration causes a current account deficit in  the 
short  run.  This  finding  is  significant  because  so  many  existing  studies  have 
either  produced ambiguous results without fully confirming the H-L-M effect 
or overturned the H-L-M effect. 
In section III, I utilize a technique developed by Judd (1985, 1987) to analyze 
the  effects  of  various  exogenous  shocks  on  consumption  and  foreign  asset 
accumulation  at  the  initial  equilibrium.  In section  IV,  I  summarize  the  main 
findings and point out directions for future research. 
I. The Viner model of mercantilism 
This section presents the argument that a direct way to formulate the objective 
function  of  the  mercantilist  economic  thinking  is  to  define  a  nation's  utility 
function on per capita consumption and per capita foreign asset holdings (the 
accumulated current account surplus): 
where  c  h  is  per  capita  consumption  of  domestic  goods,  c  1  is  per  capita 
consumption of foreign goods, b is per capita foreign asset holdings (a negative 
b is foreign borrowing), and  {3( {3  > 0) measures the mercantilist sentiment in 
the words of Cunningham (1907) or the mercantilist mentality in the words of 
Heckscher  (1955).  The  variable  b  can  also  be  broadly defined  as  'wealth', 
'treasure'  and  'riches'.  Even  in  mercantilist  heyday,  these  terms  'were  used 
with  considerable  ambiguity,  sometimes  in  broad  sense  to  cover  stocks  of 
valuable goods of any kind which could command a price, but more often in a 
narrow  sense  to  signify  only  the  precious  metals.  The  narrow  usage  was 
occasionally extended to commodities (other than  the  precious metals) which 
had great  durability  and high value per unit  of bulk,  such as precious stone, 
and even tin and copper' (Viner, 1991, p. 263). In the absence of domestic gold 
or  silver  mines,  mercantilists  advocated  the  attainment  of  the  'wealth'  and 
'treasure'  through  the  excess  of  exports  over  imports  or  a  current  account 
surplus. The function  {3w(b) can be regarded as the power a nation possesses 
and  enjoys,  which  is  an  increasing  function  of a  nation's  wealth  and  asset 
holdings; the function u(  c  h, c  1) can be understood as the utility from consump­
tion or as a measure of opulence and plenty in the words of Viner (1948). In its 
abstract  form,  the  utility  function  in  (1)  has  been  used  by Bardhan  (1967), 
Kurz (1968),  Blanchard (1983),  Zou (1991,  1994b,  1995b)  in  studying  foreign 
borrowing, capital accumulation, savings and economic growth. 
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For a small open economy, the dynamic equation of foreign asset accumula­
tion or the  current  account is given by: 
(2) 
·  y  clz  x 
b=-+rb---(l+T)c  +-
p  p  I  p, 
where y is  per capita endowment income,  r  is the  exogneous interest  returns 
on  foreign  asset  holdings,  p  is  the  exogenous  world  relative  price  of  the 
domestic  good  in  terms  of the  foreign  good, T  is  the  tariff  on  the  imported 
consumption good, x  is per capita government transfer. For simplicity, popula­
tion is assumed to be a constant. 
In the existing studies on mercantilism, the  objective function  of mercantil­
ism has been a controversial topic. Cunningham (1907) has formulated mercan­
tilism mainly as a system of power. In this system, the objective function is the 
maximisation of the national power, which in tum depends on  the wealth and 
asset holdings possessed by a nation:  'The mercantile system is concerned with 
man solely  as a being  who  pursue  national power'  (Heckscher,  1955,  val. 1,  p. 
29). According to this  interpretation, mercantilism has an objective function as 
maximizing  f<� {3w(b)e-P1dt subject to the dynamic constraint given by equation 
(2). This school does not directly define the utility on consumption because in 
its  interpretation  of  mercantilism,  'economic  well-being  and betterment  were 
not  defined  in terms  of or measured  by the  satisfying  of  revealed  community 
consumption  preferences'  (Allen,  1987).  In  the  seventeenth  century,  'accu­
mulated  wealth  was  vital,  as  well  as  the  result  of,  power.  And  wealth  was 
intimately associated with specie .... Wealth and specie were closely associated, 
however, and rising accumulation of gold and silver was taken as reflection of, 
even if it did not literally  constitute,  increasing wealth'. Indeed, 'money is the 
sinews  of war'  (Allen,  1987). 
In this formulation of mercantilism, wealth accumulation through continued 
trade surplus is only the means to achieve the supreme goal - national power. 
Heckscher (1955) explicitly states  'Mercantilism  as  a System of  Power'  in his 
study. He has provided some  detailed  examination  why mercantilism  subordi­
nates wealth and asset accumulation to power. 
Viner  (1948,  1991)  holds  a  different  point  of  view.  His  definition  of  the 
mercantilist  objective  can  be  modeled as exactly  in  functional  form  (  1):  the 
mercantilists seek both 'power and plenty (or opulence)'. This is clear from the 
title  of  his  famous study:  'Power  vs  Plenty  as  Objectives  of  Foreign  Policy  in 
the  Seventeenth  and Eighteenth  Centuries'.  In  addition to  seeking  plenty  or 
opulence as represented by  u(c�z, c1) in the objective function  (1),  the  gain  in 
wealth  accumulation  also  appears  explicitly  as  the  term,  rb,  in  the  dynamic 
equation  of  the  current  account  (  2).  Of  course,  like  Cunningham  and 
Heckscher,  Viner  also  emphasize  the  role  of  wealth  as  the  foundation  of 
power, which is represented by the function  {3w(b) in equation (1). In Viner's 
own words:  'I  believe  that  practically  all  mercantilists,  whatever  the  period, 
country, or status of the particular individual, would have subscribed to all the 
following  propositions:  (1)  wealth  is  an absolutely  essential  means  to  power, 
whether for security or for aggression;  (2)  power is essential  or valuable  as a 
means to the acquisition or retention of wealth; (3) wealth and power are each 
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proper ultimate ends of national policy; (4) there is long-run harmony between 
these ends' (Viner, 1948, 1991, P- 136)_ 
Therefore, our model specified in equations (1) and  (2) can be regarded as 
a synthesis  and  combination  of all these different  interpretations  of  mercan­
tilists' objective functions;  in  particular, it closely reflects Viner's interpretation 
of mercantilism_ 
II. Some long-run analysis of the model 
Following Bardhan (1967),  Kurz  (1968),  Calvo (1980),  Blanchard (1983),  and 
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992), the function w(b) is assumed to have the 
following  properties:  w'  > 0, w"  � 0_  In  addition,  u(c  Jz, c  f)  is increasing,  con­
cave, and continuously differentiable  in ch and c1,  and a2uj  ach  ac1  > 0_ 
The model specified in this paper is an ancient  one if it is  interpreted with 
the mercantilist mentality, it is also a modem one if it is viewed as a reflection 
of today's protectionism, nationalism and international politics and the balance 
of power_  Furthermore,  it  is  a contemporary one  because  in  its mathematical 
form it is a variation of the standard asset accumulation model in international 
finance such as Obstfeld (1981, 1982) and Tumovsky (1985, 1987)_ 
Now I tum to the analysis of the model itself.  The home country maximizes 
(1)  subject  to  (2)_  The  specification  of  asset  accumulation  equation  (2)  is 
identical to the one in Obstfeld (1982). The objective function differs from that 
of Obstfeld's paper in two aspects:  first, the time discount rate here is constant 
instead  of  being  an  increasing  function  of  the  utility;  second,  the  utility 
function is defined not only on consumption but also on foreign asset accumu­
lation. 
To derive the optimal conditions for the home country, I define the present­
value Hamiltonian as 
(3)  H=u(c﻽z,c1)+{3w(b)+A[(yjp)+rb-(chjp)-(l+T)c1+xjp]. 
where A is the costate variable. 
The first order conditions for maximization are 
aujac1=  A(l  +  T), 
au;  ach = Ajp, 




(2)  b = (yjp)  +  rb-(c﻽zjp)-(1 +  T )c1  +  (x jp)_ 
From (4) and (5), we  can solve ch and c1  as  functions of  A, p and T 
(7)  C﻽z=C﻽z(A,p,T),  c1=c1(A,p,T)_ 
It  is  easy to  show that 
(8) 
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ac﻽zJaA < 0, 
ac﻽zjaT< 0, 
ac1jaA  < 0, 
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Substitute c" =c"(A,p,T) and c1=c/A,p,T) into (2), and rewrite (6): 
(9)  b  =  (yjp) +rb-[c"(A,p,T)jp]-(1 +  T)c1U..,p,T) +xjp, 
(6)  A=(p-rH-{3w'(b). 
Upon introducing a balanced government budget in each period, government 
transfer (xjp) in our model is exactly equal to its tariff revenue  Tc1. 
Therefore, equation (9)  can be written as 
(9' >  b = (y  jp) + rb- [c,(  A,  p,  T)  jp]- c/ A,  p,  T). 
Equations  (  6)  and  (  9')  are the focus of our analysis.  The necessary  condi­
tion  for  the  existence  of a  steady state  is  that  in  (  6)  the  time  discount  rate 
needs to be greater than the interest rate 
(10)  p> r. 
This  condition  is  also  required  for  the  finite  horizon  model  in  Blanchard 
(1985).  Note that the introduction of the mercantilist instinct  {3w(b) into our 
model avoids the knife-edge problem that, for an equilibrium to exist, the time 
discount rate  has  to  equal  the  interest  rate.  In  our  model,  the  requirement 
(10)  makes  sense  because  asset  accumulation  not  only  bring  about  interest 
income r and 'opulence', it also directly gives rise to utility {3w'(b) and 'power', 
to use the terms used by Eli Heckscher and Jacob Viner. Thus in equilibrium 
the time discount rate should be larger than the interest rate but equal to the 
sum of the interest rate and the marginal utility of the power. One attractive 
feature about our formulation is that it enables us to get away from imposing 
the  equality  p  =  r,  which  is  so  common  in  much  of  international 
macroeconomics. Another way to break this link is to introduce quadratic costs 
of holding foreign bonds as in Turnovsky (1985).  We also note  that equation 
(6)  is  quite  similar  to  the  corresponding  dynamic  equation  in  Turnovsky 
(1985). 
Denoting the steady-state values of  A  and  b  as  A* 
(  6) and (  9') around  A*  and b*, we obtain 
and  b*, and linearizing 
(10)  [A] [  p-r 
b  = 
-[(ac,jaA)jp] + ac1jaA 
-{3  w"  (  b* ) l [  A  -A* l 
r  b-b*  · 
Let M denote the 2 X 2 matrix, and Df  its determinant, 
(11)  Df  =  det (M)  =  ( p-r)r-{3w"(b*){[Cac"jaA)jp] +  (ac1jaA)}. 
The equilibrium is saddle-point stable if the determinant is negative, namely, 
(12)  Df < 0. 
In this case, there  exists  a  unique perfect-foresight  path  converging to the 
equilibrium because one eigenvalue of the dynamic system is negative and one 
eigenvalue positive. These eigenvalues correspond to one state variable b  and 
one jumping variable c  in the model. If Df  is positive, there will be two positive 
eigenvalues  since  the  trace  of  the  matrix  M,  which  is  the  sum  of  the  two 
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eigenvalues, is also positive and equals the time discount rate  p;  that is to say, 
at least one eigenvalue is positive. But a positive determinant of the matrix M 
implies  that  the  dynamic  system  either  has  two  positive  eigenvalues  or  two 
negative  eigenvalues.  Thus  a  positive  trace  plus  a  positive  determinant  of 
matrix M will result in two positive eigenvalues and a totally unstable  system, 
which will not be considered in  this paper. 
With the  assumption in  ( 12), we  draw the phase diagram in  Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, both curves are downward sloping. Condition (  12) is exactly the 
same as requiring  that the slope of the curve  A =  0 be  steeper than the curve 
b  =  0 in order to have a unique saddle point path converging to the equilibrium 
A where b  =  b*, and A  = A*. 
II. A. The effect of the mercantilist mentality 
To  see  how  the  mercantilist  men_tality  f3,  affects  asset  accumulation  and 
consumption in the long run, I set A and b equal to zero in equation (  9') and 
(  6), and totally differentiate the two steady-state equations 
(l3)  M[
dA 1  = [  {[(ach/  aT  )jp]  +  (;�:;:���T  +  {[ (y-ch)IP2] 1, 
db  +[(achjap)jp]  +  actfap}dp 
where M is the same 2 X 2 matrix in (10). 
Proposition 1:  The stronger the mercantilist sentiment, the larger the long-run 
consumption and asset accumulation. 
From (13) and (12) 
(14)  dA/df3 <  0,  dbjdf3  > 0,  dctfdf3 > 0, 
where we have used the fact that both achj  aA and act!  aA are negative as in 
(8). 
The reason for this proposition is quite clear. As a nation highly values its 
wealth and power in  the world, it saves more and consumes less  in the short 
run  in  order to run  a  current account surplus and accumulate  more  foreign 
assets. More foreign asset holdings means more interest income, which in turn 
leads  to  more  consumption  in  the  long  run.  Proposition  1  is  a  very  strong 
argument for mercantilism if a nation intends to maximize its citizens' long-run 
consumption. 
II. B.  The effect of the tariff 
The effect of the tariff can be seen by Cramer's rule in ( 13) 
(14)  dAjdT= f3w"(b*){[(achjaT)jp]  +  (actfar)}/A'  < 0, 
(15)  db  jdT= ( p-r){[(  ach/  aT)  jp]  +  (act!  aT)}/  A'> o. 
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FIGURE  1.  The phase diagram and the effect of a permanent terms-of-trade deterioration. 
Proposition 2: A permanent increase in the tariff rate raises the total long-run 
consumption and asset accumulation. 
The positive effect of the tariff on asset accumulation is  in (15). To see its 
effect  on  long-run  consumption,  we  note  that  a  tariff  directly  reduces  the 
consumption of both domestic and imported goods, but it also leads to a lower 
shadow  price  .A,  which  increases  consumption.  The  net  effect  is  positive 
because, from the steady state equation, b = 0,  namely, 
(y  jp)  + rb*  -[c;;' (.A*, T)  jp]-cj (A*,  r)  = 0, 
a higher tariff increases b* and total interest  income.  Therefore, to maintain 
the equilibrium condition in the goods market, total consumption will have to 
rise in the long run, even though the impact on the consumption of the foreign 
good is ambiguous. 
Proposition 2 provides support for the mercantilist protection policy, namely, 
the  'fear  of  goods'  (Heckscher,  1955),  if  attainment  of  a  higher  long-run 
consumption  is  the  national  objective.  Both  proposition 1  and  proposition  2 
indicate  the  long-run  harmony between  wealth  and power.  Indeed,  from the 
mercantilist perspective, 'there  is  long-run  harmony between  these  two ends, 
although  in particular circumstances  it may be necessary for a time  to  make 
economic  sacrifices  in the  interest  of  ... 'long-run  prosperity'  (Viner,  1991,  p. 
136).  Following  an  increase  in  the  tariff,  short-run  consumption  will  be  cut 
because people invest more in foreign asset. But in the long run, the increased 
foreign asset accumulation gives rise to more consumption and more power for 
the nation. 
We  should  emphasize  that  proposition  2  is  derived  in  a  pure  endowment 
economy  without  market  imperfection  and  increasing  returns  to  scale  in 
production.  In the  strategic  trade  theory,  protectionist  economic  policies  are 
often justified with the presence of product differentiation on the demand side 
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and externalities on the production side. In the mercantilist model, protection­
ist economic policy such as a tariff leads to  a higher long-run asset accumula­
tion  and  consumption  in  a  world  without  any  imperfection  on  either  the 
demand side or the supply side.  Proposition 2 therefore sheds some insight on 
the  protectionist  economic  policies  in  addition  to  the  ones  offered  by  the 
strategic trade theory. 
II. C.  The effect of  a terms-of-trade shock 
Since  Obstfeld  (1982)  raised  the  doubt  about  the  existence  of  the 
Harberger-Laursen-Metzler  (H-L-M)  effect  in  an  infinite  horizon  model 
with an endogneous time preference, many contributions over the past decade 
have  explored  this  issue.  But  perhaps  it  is  a  surprise  that,  while  Obstfeld 
overturned the H-L-M effect, all other models have only produced ambiguous 
results  on the  existence  of the  H-L-M  effect under various assumptions and 
model  strategies.  For example,  Svensson  and Razin  (1983)  have  examined  the 
effect of terms-of-trade changes on a small country's consumption and current 
account  in  an  intertemporal  model.  They  demonstrate  that  a  temporary  (fu­
ture) terms-of-trade deterioration implies a deterioration (improvement) of the 
trade  balance,  whereas  a  permanent  terms-of-trade  deterioration has  an  am­
biguous  effect,  depending on the rate of time preference.  In another contribu­
tion by Persson and Svensson (1985), it is shown that the classic H-L-M effect 
can  have  any  sign  for  plausible  parameter  values,  both  for  temporary  and 
permanent  disturbance.  Ambiguities have also been  shown in various models 
by Matsuyama (1987), Sen and Turnovsky (1989), and Mansoorian (1993). 
Here it can be shown that, in the Viner model of mercantilism, there exists a 
full confirmation of the H-L-M effect: an unanticipated permanent deteriora­
tion in the terms of trade always leads to a current account deficit in the short 
run.  Suppose that the  economy is  in  the steady state A of Figure 1, and  the 
terms of tr_ade worsen permanently,  i.e.  p  goes �p forever. Then, in Figure 1, 
the curve A=  0 does not change, but the curve b = 0 shifts upward to (b)'= 0. 
Immediately following the shock, A  jumps up from the initial equilibrium point 
A to point J. Since foreign asset holdings are the state variable, b cannot jump. 
Therefore, at the time when this permanent  shock happens, consumption will 
be cut immediately and the current account goes to surplus (we will provide a 
quantitative  estimate  for  this  initial  change  in  consumption  and  the  current 
account in the next section). But after the  initial shock, along the convergent 
path from point J to the new equilibrium  A', foreign asset holding b decreases 
and  the  current  account  goes  to  a  deficit  in  the  short  run  or  during  the 
adjustment period. At the same time,  A  continues to increase,  and, from (8), 
the consumption of both the home good and imported good is decreasing.  In 
the new steady state A', the economy has smaller foreign asset holdings than 
before: b' < b*. 
Analytically,  by Cramer's rule in (13), 
(16) 
dAjdp =  [ f3w"(b*)  I  .:Y1{[  (y-ch)  jp2] +  ac1;  ap  +  (  achj ap ) IP}  > 0, 
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which is positive because  w" < 0, :Y. < 0, (y  �  c11) :2: 0 (as the endowment of the 
home goods  is  no  less  than  the  consumption  of the  home  goods),  and,  from 
(8),  oc111 ap > 0, and  dc1j ap > 0. Almost by the same reason, 
< 17) 
db  1  dp  =  [ c p  �  r) 1 ill {  [ C y  �  c  1, ) 1  p 2]  +  rl c 1/;;  p +  (  ;; c" 1;;  p) 1  p} <  o, 
and  note  that  p > r  in  order  to  have  a  steady  state  as  we  stated  earlier  m 
condition  (12). Therefore, 
Proposition 3:  The H-L-M effect always holds in the Viner model of mercan­
tilism. 
The  economic  explanation  for  proposition  3  is  as  follows:  a  permanent 
deterioration  of the  terms of  trade  reduces  the  small economy's  income,  the 
home  country  responds to this  permanent  shock by  lowering  its consumption 
immediately  following  the  shock.  Since  the  preference  is  directly  defined  on 
both  consumption  and  foreign  asset  holdings,  a  lower  consumption  with  un­
changed foreign asset holdings upsets the initial  equilibrium condition between 
consumption  and  foreign  asset  holdings.  Therefore,  the  home  country  will 
convert  part of  its foreign asset  holdings  into  consumption  because  consump­
tion  is  now  more  valuable  than  foreign  asset.  In  the  short  run,  the  current 
account  goes  to a deficit,  and,  in  the  long  run,  foreign  asset  accumulation  is 
reduced.  Thus in  the Viner model of mercantilism,  the H-L-M effect  always 
holds.  This  confirmation  of  the  H-L-M  effect  as  a  result  of  a  permanent 
terms-of-trade deterioration stands in  sharp contrast to the Obstfeld model; it 
is also a clear-cut  result without the ambiguities presented in so many existing 
studies.  In passing, we shall note that  the ambiguities may continue when the 
mercantilist  model  is  extended  to  include  capital  accumulation  and  variable 
rate of time preference. 
III. The impacts of various shocks at the initial equilibrium 
In this section, it is assumed that the home country is in an equilibrium at time 
t =  0. In order to examine the effects of various shocks on consumption and the 
current  account at this initial equilibrium,  I  follow a technique  developed by 
Judd  (1985,  1987).  A  different  analysis  of  the  current  account  in  a  finite 
horizon model is presented in Zou (1994a). 
Suppose that at time t = 0, i.e. today, the economy is in the steady state  b* 
and  A*  corresponding to the initial terms of trade  p*, the initial tariff rate  T*, 
the initial  interest  rate  r*,  and the initial  mercantilist  sentiment  f3 *.  Also at 
time  t =  0,  the  terms  of  trade,  the  tariff  rate,  the  interest  rate,  and  the 
mercantilist sentiment change as follows 
(18)  p' =  p* + ep(t),  T1 = T* + BT(t),  r' =r* +  er(t), 
{3' = f3* + ef3(t), 
where  e  is  a parameter and functions  p(t), T(t),  r(t) and  f3(t)  represent the 
intertemporal changes of various parameters in a magnitude-free fashion since 
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c: can represent different magnitude of change.  For example, a change in the 
terms of trade during a future  time  T1  < t < T2  can  be  represented by setting 
p(t) to be  one  for  T1  < t < T2  and  zero  otherwise.  In  this  way,  p(t) can  be 
regarded as  a step function. 
Substituting p', T', r' and {3' into equations (  6) and (  9')  yields 
(19) 
(20) 
A= ( p-r*-c:r(t))A-( {3*  + c:{3(t))w'(b), 
b = [y  j(p*  +  c:p(t))]-C/A,p*  +  t:p(t  ), T*  +  t:T(t)) 
- [c11(A,p*  +  ep(t),T*  +  n(t))j(p*  +  c:p(t))] + (r*  +  c:r(t))b. 
The solutions for b and A will depend on both t and e. I write the solutions 
as b(t, c:) and A(t, c:). Since c: = 0 implies that the system remains at the initial 
steady  state,  the  effects  of  a  terms-of-trade  change  can  be  seen  from  the 
impact  on the paths  of b and  A as  c:  varies from zero to  a  small positive or 
negative value. Formally, I define the initial impacts of  c: on b and A here: 
b)t) = ab(t,O)jac:,  A)t)  = aA(t,O)jac:, 
b"(t) = a[ab(t,O)jac:]/at,  A8(t) = a[aA(t,O)jac:]/at. 
Differentiating equation (19) and (20) with respect to c: and evaluating the 
derivatives at  c: = 0 yield a pair of differential equations in the variables be and 
Ae 
(21) [A"] [  p-r 
be 
=  -[ac1jaA+(ac11jaA)/p*] 
where 
(22)  v1(t)  = -A*r(t)  -w'(b*)f3(t), 
(23)  vz(t) = b*r(t)-{Cac1jaT) +  [(achjaT)(ljp*)]}T(t) 
- {[ (y-c11) jp*2]  +  (  ac1;  ap)  +  [(  ac11/  ap  )(ljp*) }p(t  ). 
the coefficient for p(t) is  always negative because (y-ch) is  positive  as  the 
home goods endowment is no less than the home goods consumption, ac1;ap 
and ac11j  ap are both positive from (8). 
Let me continue to denote the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in (21) as 
D:.. Then, for a saddle-point equilibrium,  the positive and negative eigenvalues 
for the Jacobian matrix are given by  f.L  and  w,  respectively 
(24>  JL= [ p+Vp2-4ti.] !2>o, 
(25)  w = [ p- v'  p2-4�]  /2 < 0. 
As  in  Judd  (1985,  1987),  the  Laplace  transform  can  be  utilized  to  solve 
equation  (21).  For  sufficiently  large  positive  s,  the  Laplace  transform  of  a 
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function f(t)(t  > 0) is another function F(s), where 
F(s) = {f(t)e-'1 dt. 
0 
Let A)s), B,(s),  R(s), T(s), P(s) and H(s)  be  the  Laplace 
AJt), b,(t), r(t), T(t), p(t) and f3(t), respectively. Then 
transforms  of 
(26)  [A,] [  p-r  s B£  =  -[ac1jaA+(ac1JaA)jp*] 
-f3w"(b*)][A,.l [V1(s)  +  A)O)l 
r  B, + V2(s)  +  b,(O)  ' 
where 
V1(s)  = -A*R(s)  -w'(b*)H(s), 
V2(s) = b*R(s)- {Cac1jaT)  +  [(achjaT)Cljp*)J}T(s) 
-{[ (y-c11)  jp*  2] +  (  acfj  ap)  +  [(  achf  ap  )(ljp*)  }PC  s). 
Solving for A"(s) and B)s) in (26) 
(27) 
f3w"(b*)]-1[V/s)  +A,,{O)l
·  s-r  Vz(s) 
I have  dropped b/0) in equation (27) because b is the  state variable and the 
initial  foreign  asset  b(O) cannot  be  altered  immediately.  But  the  costate 
variable A can jump and the jump is necessary to assure the convergence of the 
two variables  on the perfect foresight path. To pin down the  initial jump in  A, 
namely,  A/0),  it  is  noted  that  the  existence  of  a  saddle-point  equilibrium 
implies  a  bounded  steady state  foreign  asset  accumulation  for  any  t:.  There­
fore, B/s) must be finite for all s  > 0, even for s =  J.L (the positive eigenvalue 
of  the  dynamic  system).  However,  when s = J.L,  the  2 X 2  matrix  in  (27)  is 
singular and its inverse does not exist. To remove this singularity, implicitly the 
numerators on the right hand side have to be zero because the denominator is 
equal to (s-J.L)(s-w),  which is zero when s = J.L. That is to say 
(28)  (  J.L-r)[V1(  J.L)  +  A"(O)]-f3w"(b*  )V2( J.L) = 0. 
From (28), I have 
(29) 
A"(O) = -V1(J.L)  +f3w"(b*)V2(J.L)(J.L-r)-1 
=  -A*  R(  J.L)-w'(b*  )H(  J.L)  +  f3w"(b*  )(  J.L-r)  -I {b*  R(  J.L)- {Cacfj  aT) 
+[(achjaT)(ljp*)]}T(  J.L)-{[Cy-ch)jp*2] +  (acfjap) 
+  [(  achf  ap  )(ljp*  )}P(  J.L)}. 
Since P(  J.L) is just the present value of future terms-of-trade shock discounted 
at the positive eigenvalue: P(  J.L) = f�p(t)e-11-1  dt, the initial jump in the shadow 
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price  of the  foreign  asset  is always  positively  related  to  the  discounted,  future 
terms-of-trade shock because the coefficient of P( J-L) in (29) is always positive. 
With  the  information  of  A,.(O), I  can  substitute  both  A,.(O) and  b/0) (the 
latter  is  always  zero)  into  equation  (21)  and  find  out  the  responses  of  the 
initial  current  account  to various  shocks 
(30) 
h)O)  = -{(ac1jaA) +  [(ac"/dA)(ljp*)J}A£(0) +  V/0) 
=  -{  (  ac1;  aA) + [(  ac"j  aA)(ljp*  )J}{-A*  R( J-L)-w'(b*  )H( J-L) 
+  [3w"  (  b*  )( J-L-r) �I {  b*  R( J-L)  -{  (  ac  tl  dr) +  [  (  aclrj  ar  )(l  jp*)  l}  T( J-L) 
-{[Cy-c")jp*2] + (ac1jap) +[(ac11jdp)(ljp*)}P( J-L)}} 
+  b*r(O)-{Cac1;ar) +  [(dc1jdr)(ljp*)l}r(O) 
-{[Cy-c11)/p*2] +  (ac1jap) +  [(ac11jdp)(ljp*)}p(O). 
From (30), a few observations can be derived. 
First,  if  the  initial  equilibrium  asset  holdings  are  positive,  then  any  future 
increase in the interest rate results in a current account deficit today 
dbe(O)jdR( J-L)  =-{Cac1;aA) + [(ac"jaA)(ljp*)]} 
X {  -A* + {3 w" (  b*  )  ( J-L - r)  �  1 b*  } < 0, 
which is negative if the  steady-state asset  accumulation b* is positive. This is 
true because  any future rise in  the interest rate leads to more future income 
for  the  home country.  To smooth  its consumption, the  home  country  spends 
more  today  by  cutting  its  current  asset  holding.  Thus,  the  current  account 
deteriorates  today. 
Second,  a  rise  in  the  mercantilist  mentality  {3  in  the  future  drives today's 
current account to a deficit 
db"(O)jdH( f.L)  = {Cac1jaA) +  [(dc﻽z/dA)(ljp*)l}w'(b*)H(  f.L) < 0. 
This result "makes sense because  a rise in  f3  in the  future  will increase  asset 
holdings  and  raises  future  income.  Therefore,  to  smooth  consumption,  the 
home country increases its consumption today. The rising consumption without 
a corresponding increase in current income worsens the trade balance and the 
current account today. 
Third,  a  higher  tariff  in  the  futue  has  a  negative  impact  on the  current 
account  today  (note  that  ( f.L- r)  > 0  in  equation  (30)  ).  This  result  holds 
because a future rise in the tariff leads to more asset accumulation and more 
income  in the  future  (see  proposition  2).  Thus,  to  smooth  consumption,  the 
home country converts part of its current asset holdings to current  consump­
tion. In this way, today's current account goes to a deficit. 
Fourth,  any  future  deterioration  (improvement)  in  the  terms  of  trade  im­
proves  (worsens)  the  current  account  today.  (To  see  this,  note  that  the 
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coefficient for P( fL) in (30)  is always positive.) The economic intuition behind 
this  observation  is  as  follows:  a  future  deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade 
reduces  future  income.  The  home  country  reacts  to  this  anticipated  future 
shock by cutting its consumption today. As shown in proposition 3, the long-run 
foreign asset holdings will also be reduced if the shock is permanent.  But in the 
very short run, the foreign asset holding is a state variable, which cannot jump 
down immediately.  Thus only consumption  will  be reduced.  This  is  shown  as 
the jump from point  A to point J in Figure 1. In the transition from point J to 
point  A'  in Figure 1, both consumption and foreign asset  holdings are reduced 
as a result  of a permanent  terms-of-trade shock. 
Fifth,  a current  rise in the interest  rate  and the  tariff rate improves today's 
current account while a current deterioration in  the terms of trade worsens the 
current account today. Thus, the effects of all these current shocks on  today's 
current account are just the opposite of the ones of  future  shocks.  A current 
rise  in  the  interest  rate  leads  to  more  income  today  and  improves  today's 
current account; a current rise in the tariff reduces consumption and increases 
trade  surplus;  finally,  a  deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade  today,  i.e.  p(O) 
increases,  lowers  the  home  country's  income  today  and  worsens  its  current 
account because a momentary income reduction as a result of the terms-of-trade 
shock  will  not affect  current consumption  of  both home  goods and imported 
goods. 
IV. Conclusions 
This  paper  has  formulated  Jacob  Viner's  interpretation  of  mercantilism  by 
defining  both  consumption and foreign  asset  accumulation in the  utility  func­
tion to reflect power vs plenty as objectives of a mercantilist nation. This model 
also  has  various  applications  and interpretations:  nationalism  in  the sense  of 
Bardhan  (1967);  the  psychological  benefit  (costs)  of  foreign  asset  holdings 
(foreign  borrowing)  in  the  sense  of  Blanchard  (1983);  the  wealth-is-status 
model in Frank (1985), Cole et al. (1992), and Fershtman and Weiss (1993); and 
the  capitalist-spirit  model  as  in  Zou  (1994b,  1995b)  and  Bakshi  and  Chen 
(1996). 
The most interesting,  and perhaps surprising fact about this Viner model of 
mercantilism  is  its  theoretical  predictions.  We  have  shown  that  in  the  Viner 
model a nation  with  strong  mercantilist  sentiment  has  high  consumption  and 
large foreign asset accumulation in the  long run;  a permanent rise in the tariff 
rate leads to more foreign  asset accumulation  and more total consumption  in 
the  long run; a permanent terms-of-trade shock worsens the current account in 
the  short  run,  which  provides  a  full  confirmation  of  the  existence  of  the 
H-L-M effect in an infinite horizon model. 
In  future  research,  it  is  desirable  to  extent  the  endowment-economy and 
small-economy model in this paper into a big-country model with both capital 
accumulation and foreign asset holdings. It should also be interesting to study 
fiscal policy, monetary policy and the exchange-rate theory in the Viner model 
of  mercantilism.  Furthermore,  the  mercantilist  model  can  be  extended  to 
consider the relative wealth or relative power status in a many-country world as 
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in Bakshi and Chen (1996), where the utility function from wealth and power is 
modified to be {3w(b(t)jB(t)) with B(t) as the average wealth level in the rest 
of the world. 
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